

Semi Annual Treasury Outturn Report 2016/17

1. Introduction

The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's Treasury Management Code (CIPFA's TM Code) requires that Authorities report on the performance of the treasury management function at least twice yearly (mid-year and at year end). This report is the mid year report.

The Authority's Treasury Management Strategy for 2016/17 was considered by Audit Committee on the 3rd March 2016 and subsequently approved by full Council on 10th March 2016 which can be accessed [here](#).

The Authority has borrowed and invested substantial sums of money and is therefore exposed to financial risks including the loss of invested funds and the revenue effect of changing interest rates. This report covers treasury activity and the associated monitoring and control of risk.

2. External Context - Economic Commentary and Outlook

The preliminary estimate of Q2 2016 GDP showed reasonably strong growth as the economy grew 0.7% quarter-on-quarter, as compared to 0.4% in Q1 and year/year growth running at a healthy pace of 2.2%. However the UK economic outlook changed significantly on 23rd June 2016. The surprise result of the referendum on EU membership prompted forecasters to rip up previous projections and dust off worst-case scenarios. Growth forecasts had already been downgraded as 2016 progressed, as the very existence of the referendum dampened business investment, but the crystallisation of the risks and the subsequent political turmoil prompted a sharp decline in household, business and investor sentiment.

The repercussions of this plunge in sentiment on economic growth were judged by the Bank of England to be severe, prompting the Monetary Policy Committee to initiate substantial monetary policy easing at its August meeting to mitigate the worst of the downside risks. This included a cut in Bank Rate to 0.25%, further gilt and corporate bond purchases (QE) and cheap funding for banks (Term Funding Scheme) to maintain the supply of credit to the economy. The minutes of the August meeting also suggested that many members of the Committee supported a further cut in Bank Rate to near-zero levels (the Bank, however, does not appear keen to follow peers into negative rate territory) and more QE should the economic outlook worsen.

In response to the Bank of England's policy announcement, money market rates and bond yields declined to new record lows. Since the onset of the financial crisis over eight years ago, Arlingclose's rate outlook has progressed from 'lower for longer' to 'even lower for even longer' to, now, 'even lower for the indeterminable future'.

The new members of the UK government, particularly the Prime Minister and Chancellor, are likely to follow the example set by the Bank of England. After six years of fiscal consolidation, the Autumn Statement on 23rd November is likely to witness fiscal initiatives to support economic activity and confidence, most likely infrastructure investment. Tax cuts or something similar cannot be ruled out.

Whilst the economic growth consequences of BREXIT remain speculative, there is uniformity in expectations that uncertainty over the UK's future trade relations with the EU and the rest of the world will weigh on economic activity and business investment, dampen investment intentions and tighten credit availability, prompting lower activity levels and potentially a rise in unemployment. These effects will dampen economic growth through the second half of 2016 and in 2017.

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Meanwhile, inflation is expected to pick up due to a rise in import prices, dampening real wage growth and real investment returns. The August Quarterly *Inflation Report* from the Bank of England forecasts a rise in CPI to 0.9% by the end of calendar 2016 and thereafter a rise closer to the Bank's 2% target over the coming year, as previous rises in commodity prices and the sharp depreciation in sterling begin to drive up imported material costs for companies.

The rise in inflation is highly unlikely to prompt monetary tightening by the Bank of England, with policymakers looking through import-led CPI spikes, concentrating instead on the negative effects of Brexit on economic activity and, ultimately, inflation.

Market reaction: Following the referendum result gilt yields fell sharply across the maturity spectrum on the view that Bank Rate would remain extremely low for the foreseeable future. The yield on the 10-year gilt fell from 1.37% on 23rd June to a low of 0.52% in August, a quarter of what it was at the start of 2016. The 10-year gilt yield has since risen to 0.69% at the end of September. The yield on 2- and 3-year gilts briefly dipped into negative territory intra-day on 10th August to -0.1% as prices were driven higher by the Bank of England's bond repurchase programme. However both yields have since recovered to 0.07% and 0.08% respectively. The fall in gilt yields was reflected in the fall in PWLB borrowing rates, as evidenced in Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix 2.

On the other hand, after an initial sharp drop, equity markets appeared to have shrugged off the result of the referendum and bounced back despite warnings from the IMF on the impact on growth from 'Brexit' as investors counted on QE-generated liquidity to drive risk assets.

The most noticeable fall in money market rates was for very short-dated periods (overnight to 1 month) where rates fell to between 0.1% and 0.2%

3. Local Context

At 31/3/2016 the Authority's underlying need to borrow for capital purposes as measured by the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) was £114.1m, while usable reserves and working capital which are the underlying resources available for investment were £23.4m. The Authority had £92.9m of borrowing, including £23.0m of short term borrowing and also had £11.4m of investments.

The Authority's current strategy is to maintain borrowing and investments below their underlying levels, referred to as internal borrowing, subject to holding a minimum investment balance of £0m to £5m.

The Authority has an increasing CFR over the next 5 years due to the capital programme, but minimal investments and will therefore require to borrow over the forecast period. It is currently anticipated that this will take the form of short term borrowing up to a total of £47.0m.

4. Borrowing Strategy during the half year

At 30/9/2016 the Authority held £85.9m of loans, a decrease of £7.0m on 31/3/2016. This is due to a large capital receipt received in September 2016 and grant funding relating to the 21C schools program coming in in advance of need during the first half year.

The Authority expects to borrow an additional £8m short term borrowing before 31st March 2017. This figure may vary if capital receipts or capital expenditure vary from the forecast at month 6. No long term borrowing is anticipated.

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The Authority's chief objective when borrowing continues to be striking an appropriately low risk balance between securing low interest costs and achieving cost certainty over the period for which funds are required, with flexibility to renegotiate loans should the Authority's long-term plans change being a secondary objective.

Affordability and the "cost of carry" remained important influences on the Authority's borrowing strategy alongside the consideration that, for any borrowing undertaken ahead of need, the proceeds would have to be invested in the money markets at rates of interest significantly lower than the cost of borrowing. As short-term interest rates have remained, and are likely to remain for a significant period, lower than long-term rates, the Authority determined it was more cost effective in the short-term to use internal resources and borrow short-term loans instead.

The benefits of internal borrowing were monitored regularly against the potential for incurring additional costs by deferring borrowing into future years when long-term borrowing rates are forecast to rise. Arlingclose assists the Authority with this 'cost of carry' and breakeven analysis. Despite the fall in gilt yields and PWLB loan rates in the period around the EU referendum vote, the Authority felt that this policy was still valid. See Tables 2 & 3 in Appendix 2 for gilt yields and PWLB rates.

The Authority is forecasting to fund £12.5m of its capital expenditure from borrowing. Temporary and short-dated loans borrowed from the markets, predominantly from other local authorities, has remained affordable and attractive. The Authority had £22.0m of such loans at the 30th Sep 2016, held at an average rate of 0.53% and have an average outstanding life of 3.5 months. An additional £3.0m of Local Authority loans of maturity up to 2 years was also held at that time.

Borrowing Activity in 2016/17

	Balance on 01/04/2016 £m	Maturing Debt £m	Debt Prematurely Repaid £m	New Borrowing £m	Balance on 30/09/2016 £m	Avg Rate % ; Avg Life (yrs)
CFR	114.1					
Short Term Borrowing ¹	23.0	(1.0)	0.0	0.0	22.0	0.53% ; 0.3
Long Term Borrowing						
- PWLB	52.7	(5.9)	0.0	0.0	46.8	4.46% ; 16.9
- Local Authorities	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.98% ; 1.1
- Market Loans	13.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.6	4.80% ; 25.2
- WG Specific Loans	2.5	(0.1)	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.0% ; 10
TOTAL BORROWING	94.8	(7.0)	0.0	0.0	87.8	
Other Long Term Liabilities	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	NA
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT	96.0	(7.0)	0.0	0.0	89.0	
Increase/ (Decrease) in Borrowing £m					(7.0)	

¹ Loans with maturities less than 1 year.

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LOBOs: The Authority holds £13.6m of LOBO (Lender's Option Borrower's Option) loans where the lender has the option to propose an increase in the interest rate at set dates, following which the Authority has the option to either accept the new rate or to repay the loan at no additional cost. These LOBOS have options at 6 monthly intervals, none of which were exercised by the lender. The Authority acknowledges there is an element of refinancing risk even though in the current interest rate environment lenders are unlikely to exercise their options.

Debt Rescheduling:

The premium charge for early repayment of PWLB debt remained relatively expensive for the loans in the Authority's portfolio and therefore unattractive for debt rescheduling activity. No rescheduling activity was undertaken as a consequence.

5. Investment Activity

The Authority held £11.4m of invested funds at 31st March 2016 & £22.5m at 30th Sep 2016, representing income received in advance of expenditure plus balances and reserves held. Cashflow forecasts indicated that during 2016/17 the Authority's investment balances would remain at this low level.

The Guidance on Local Government Investments gives priority to security and liquidity and the Authority's aim is to achieve a yield commensurate with these principles.

The transposition of European Union directives into UK legislation places the burden of rescuing failing EU banks disproportionately onto unsecured local authority investors through potential bail-in of unsecured bank deposits including certificates of deposit. Please note: the outcome of the EU referendum does not alter the UK's legislated bail-in resolution regime.

Given the increasing risk and continued low returns from short-term unsecured bank investments, the Authority will continue to assess its level of diversification across investment counterparties and if necessary explore more secure asset classes. Currently, the majority of the Authority's surplus cash is invested in short-term unsecured bank & building society deposits including certificates of deposit & money market funds and also in WG backed deposits and in other local authorities. This level of exposure is considered satisfactory as the levels of investments are expected to reduce to lower levels reducing risk further.

This reduction in investment balances is anticipated as the Authority will have to borrow to continue to fund the 21C schools program so the intention is to keep investments at a low level to reduce investment risk and the cost of carry. The level of investments has increased since the 30th Sep 2016 temporarily, due to a large capital receipt with uncertain timing, coming in. Levels will fall again towards the end of the year.

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Investment Activity in 2016/17

Investments	Balance on 01/04/2016 £m	Balance on 30/09/2016 £m	Avg Rate (%) ; Avg Life
UK Government: - DMADF - Treasury Bills	3.0	0.0	0.15% ; NA
Unsecured Investments (call accounts, deposits and CDs) with financial institutions - rated [A-] or higher	3.2	7.7	0.42% ; 1 to 183 days
Investments with other Local Authorities	0.0	4.5	0.27% ; 2 mths
Money Market Funds	5.2	10.3	0.40% ; NA
TOTAL INVESTMENTS	11.4	22.5	0.41%
Increase/ (Decrease) in Investments £m			

Security of capital has remained the Authority's main investment objective. This has been maintained by following the Authority's counterparty policy as set out in its Treasury Management Strategy Statement for 2016/17.

Counterparty credit quality was assessed and monitored with reference to credit ratings (the Authority's minimum long-term counterparty rating for institutions defined as having "high credit quality" is [A-] across rating agencies Fitch, S&P and Moody's); credit default swap prices, financial statements, information on potential government support and reports in the quality financial press.

Credit Risk

The table below shows counterparty credit quality as measured by credit ratings and the percentage of Monmouthshire's investment portfolio exposed to bail-in risk.

Date	Value Weighted Average - Credit Risk Score	Value Weighted Average - Credit Rating	Time Weighted Average - Credit Risk Score	Time Weighted Average - Credit Rating	Investments exposed to bail-in risk %
31/03/2016	3.88	AA-	2.91	AA	75.6
30/06/2016	4.15	AA-	4.7	A+	70.6
30/09/2016	4.34	AA-	3.26	AA	80

Scoring:

- Value weighted average reflects the credit quality of investments according to the size of the deposit
- Time weighted average reflects the credit quality of investments according to the maturity of the deposit
- AAA = highest credit quality = 1
- D = lowest credit quality = 26

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-Aim = A- or higher credit rating, with a score of 7 or lower, to reflect current investment approach with main focus on security

Counterparty Update

Various indicators of credit risk reacted negatively to the result of the referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union. UK bank credit default swaps saw a modest rise but bank share prices fell sharply, on average by 20%, with UK-focused banks experiencing the largest falls. Non-UK bank share prices were not immune although the fall in their share prices was less pronounced.

Fitch downgraded the UK's sovereign rating by one notch to AA from AA+, and Standard & Poor's downgraded its corresponding rating by two notches to AA from AAA. Fitch, S&P and Moody's have a negative outlook on the UK. S&P took similar actions on rail company bonds guaranteed by the UK Government. S&P also downgraded the long-term ratings of the local authorities to which it assigns ratings as well as the long-term rating of the EU from AA+ to AA, the latter on the agency's view that it lowers the union's fiscal flexibility and weakens its political cohesion.

Moody's affirmed the ratings of nine UK banks and building societies but revised the outlook to negative for those that it perceived to be exposed to a more challenging operating environment arising from the 'leave' outcome.

There was no immediate change to Arlingclose's credit advice on UK banks and building societies as a result of the referendum result. Our advisor believes there is a risk that the uncertainty over the UK's future trading prospects will bring forward the timing of the next UK recession.

The European Banking Authority released the results of its 2016 round of stress tests on the single market's 51 largest banks after markets closed on Friday 29th July. The stress tests gave a rather limited insight into how large banks might fare under a particular economic scenario. When the tests were designed earlier this year, a 1.7% fall in GDP over three years must have seemed like an outside risk. Their base case of 5.4% growth now looks exceptionally optimistic and the stressed case could be closer to reality. No bank was said to have failed the tests. The Royal Bank of Scotland made headline news as one of the worst performers as its ratios fell by some of the largest amounts, but from a relatively high base. Barclays Bank ended the test with Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratios below the 8% threshold, and would be required to raise more capital should the stressed scenario be realised. The tests support our cautious approach on these banks.

In July Arlingclose completed a review of unrated building societies' annual financial statements. Cumberland, Harpenden and Vernon Building Society were removed from Arlingclose's advised list, following a deterioration in credit indicators. The maximum advised maturity was also lowered for eleven societies from 6 months to 100 days due to the uncertainty facing the UK property market following the EU referendum.

In June Moody's downgraded Finland from Aaa to Aa1 on its view that Finnish economic growth will remain weak over the coming years, reducing the country's ability to absorb economic shocks.

Fitch upgraded the long-term rating of ING Bank from A to A+ based on Fitch's view of the bank's solid and stable financial metrics and its expectation that that the improvement in earnings will be maintained.

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Fitch also upgraded Svenska Handelsbanken's long-term rating from AA- to AA reflecting the agency's view that the bank's earnings and profitability will remain strong, driven by robust income generation, good cost efficiency and low loan impairments.

Budgeted Income and Outturn

The average cash balances were £21.5m during the half year. The UK Bank Rate had been maintained at 0.5% since March 2009 until August 2016, when it was cut to 0.25%. It is now forecast to fall further towards zero but not go negative. Short-term money market rates have remained at relatively low levels (see Table 1 in Appendix 2). Following the reduction in Bank Rate, rates for very short-dated periods (overnight - 1 month) fell to between 0.1% and 0.2%. Debt Management Account Deposit Facility (DMADF) rates fell to 0.15% for periods up to 3 months and to 0.10% for 4 - 6 month deposits.

The investment income forecast for the year at month 6 was £59.0m. This compares to the budgeted income for the year of £52.9m.

The Bank Rate is expected to be cut further towards zero in the coming months, which will in turn lower the rates short-dated money market investments with banks and building societies. This has been built into the month 6 forecast.

6. Compliance with Prudential Indicators

The Authority confirms compliance with its Prudential Indicators for 2016/17, which were set on 10th March 2016 as part of the Authority's Treasury Management Strategy Statement.

Treasury Management Indicators

The Authority measures and manages its exposures to treasury management risks using the following indicators.

Interest Rate Exposures: This indicator is set to control the Authority's exposure to interest rate risk. The upper limits on fixed and net variable rate interest rate exposure will be:

	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19
Upper limit on fixed interest rate exposure	£100m	£100m	£100m
Actual	£50.4		
Upper limit on net variable interest rate exposure (Debt less Investments)	£50m	£50m	£50m
Actual	£31.1		

Fixed rate investments and borrowings are those where the rate of interest is fixed for more than one year. Instruments that mature within one year are classed as variable rate.

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Maturity Structure of Fixed Rate Borrowing: This indicator is set to control the Authority's exposure to refinancing risk of borrowing taken out for more than one year. The upper and lower limits on the maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing will be:

	Upper %	Lower %	Actual Sep 16 £m ; %
Under 12 months - Other	50	0	0 ; 0%
Under 12 months - LOBO's			13.6 ; 27%
12 months and within 24 months	40	0	3.5 ; 7%
24 months and within 5 years	45	0	4.9 ; 10%
5 years and within 10 years	30	0	6.2 ; 12%
10 years and above	100	0	22.1 ; 44%

Principal Sums Invested for Periods Longer than 364 days: The purpose of this indicator is to control the Authority's exposure to the risk of incurring losses by seeking early repayment of its investments. The limits on the total principal sum invested to final maturities beyond the period end will be:

	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19
Limit on principal invested beyond year end	£5m	£5m	£5m
Actual	£0	£0	£0

Security: The Authority has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to credit risk by monitoring the value-weighted average [credit rating] or [credit score] of its investment portfolio. This is calculated by applying a score to each investment (AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.) and taking the arithmetic average, weighted by the size of each investment.

	Target	Actual 30/9/2016
Portfolio average credit rating / score	A- / 5.0	AA- / 4.34

7. Investment Training

The needs of the Authority's treasury management staff for training in investment management are assessed on an ongoing basis and formerly as part of the staff appraisal process, and additionally when the responsibilities of individual members of staff change.

Staff attend training courses, seminars and conferences provided by Arlingclose and CIPFA.

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8. Outlook for the remainder of 2016/17

The economic outlook for the UK has immeasurably altered following the popular vote to leave the EU. The long-term position of the UK economy will be largely dependent on the agreements the government is able to secure with the EU, particularly with regard to Single Market access.

The short to medium-term outlook has been more downbeat due to the uncertainty generated by the result and the forthcoming negotiations. Economic and political uncertainty will likely dampen or delay investment intentions, prompting lower activity levels and potentially a rise in unemployment. The downward trend in growth apparent on the run up to the referendum may continue through the second half of 2016, although some economic data has held up better than was initially expected, perhaps suggesting a less severe slowdown than feared.

Arlingclose has changed its central case for the path of Bank Rate over the next three years. Arlingclose believes any currency-driven inflationary pressure will be looked through by Bank of England policymakers. Arlingclose's central case is for Bank Rate to remain at 0.25%, but there is a 40% possibility of a drop to close to zero, with a small chance of a reduction below zero.

Gilt yields are forecast to be broadly flat from current levels, albeit experiencing short-term volatility.

	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19
Official Bank Rate													
Upside risk	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Arlingclose Central Case	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Downside risk	-0.25	-0.25	-0.25	-0.25	-0.25	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50

Global interest rate expectations have been pared back considerably. There remains a possibility that the Federal Reserve will wait until after November's presidential election, and probably hike interest rates in December 2016 but only if economic conditions warrant.

In addition, Arlingclose believes that the Government and the Bank of England have both the tools and the willingness to use them to prevent market-wide problems leading to bank insolvencies. The cautious approach to credit advice means that the banks currently on the Authority's counterparty list have sufficient equity buffers to deal with any localised problems in the short term.

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Appendix 1

Prudential Indicators 2016/17

The Local Government Act 2003 requires the Authority to have regard to CIPFA's *Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities* (the Prudential Code) when determining how much money it can afford to borrow. The objectives of the Prudential Code are to ensure, within a clear framework, that the capital investment plans of local authorities are affordable, prudent and sustainable, and that treasury management decisions are taken in accordance with good professional practice. To demonstrate that the Authority has fulfilled these objectives, the Prudential Code sets out the following indicators that must be set and monitored each year.

Estimates of Capital Expenditure: The Authority's planned capital expenditure and financing may be summarised as follows. These are based on the draft Capital 1718 MTFP.

Capital Expenditure and Financing	2015/16 Actual £m	2016/17 Estimate £m	2017/18 Estimate £m	2018/19 Estimate £m
Total Expenditure	18.8	48.0	42.3	15.4
Capital Receipts	7.8	7.7	17.9	6.1
Government Grants	7.2	20.3	11.3	4.0
Reserves & revenue	0.9	1.1	0.0	0.0
Borrowing	2.9	17.4	11.6	3.8
Vehicle financing	0.0	1.5	1.5	1.5
Total Financing	18.8	48.0	42.3	15.4

Estimates of Capital Financing Requirement: The Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) measures the Authority's underlying need to borrow for a capital purpose.

Capital Financing Requirement	31.03.16 Actual £m	31.03.17 Estimate £m	31.03.18 Estimate £m	31.03.19 Estimate £m
Total CFR	114.1	121.9	128.2	126.5

The CFR is forecast to rise by £14.1m over the next two years as capital expenditure financed by debt outweighs resources put aside for debt repayment.

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Gross Debt and the Capital Financing Requirement: In order to ensure that over the medium term debt will only be for a capital purpose, the Authority should ensure that debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of capital financing requirement in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional capital financing requirement for the current and next two financial years. This is a key indicator of prudence.

Debt	31.03.16 Actual £m	30.03.17 Estimate £m	31.03.18 Estimate £m	31.03.19 Estimate £m
Borrowing	94.8	106.2	117.8	121.5
Finance leases & PFI liabilities	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Total Debt	96.0	107.4	119.0	122.7

Total debt is expected to remain below the CFR during the forecast period.

The actual debt levels are monitored against the Operational Boundary and Authorised Limit for External Debt, below.

Operational Boundary for External Debt: The Operational Boundary is based on the Authority's estimate of most likely, i.e. prudent, but not worst case scenario for external debt.

Operational Boundary Limits set in 1617 Treasury Strategy	2016/17 £m	2017/18 £m	2018/19 £m
Borrowing	113.0	124.3	126.0
Other long-term liabilities	1.1	1.1	1.0
Total Debt	114.1	125.4	127.0

The Authority confirms that during the first half of 2016/17, the overall Operational Boundary was not breached. Borrowing reached a maximum of £94.8m and Total debt reached a maximum of £96.0m during the first half of the year.

Authorised Limit for External Debt: The Authorised Limit is the affordable borrowing limit determined in compliance with the Local Government Act 2003. It is the maximum amount of debt that the Authority can legally owe. The authorised limit provides headroom over and above the operational boundary for unusual cash movements.

Authorised Limit set in 1617 Treasury Strategy	2016/17 £m	2017/18 £m	2018/19 £m
Borrowing	134.0	145.3	147.0

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Other long-term liabilities	2.6	2.6	2.5
Total Debt	136.6	147.9	149.5

The Authority confirms that during 2016/17 the Authorised Limit was not breached at any time.

Ratio of Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream: This is an indicator of affordability and highlights the revenue implications of existing and proposed capital expenditure by identifying the proportion of the revenue budget required to meet financing costs, net of investment income.

Ratio of Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream	2016/17 Estimate %	2017/18 Estimate %	2018/19 Estimate %
Estimate in 1617 Strategy	4.78	6.31	6.54
Current forecast	4.40		

There is a slight decrease against Estimate due to a surplus of council tax income and a reduction in interest payable for the year.

Incremental Impact of Capital Investment Decisions: This is an indicator of affordability that shows the impact of capital investment decisions on Council Tax levels. The incremental impact is the total revenue budget requirement of the current year's forecast capital programme.

Incremental Impact of Capital Investment Decisions	2016/17 Estimate %	2017/18 Estimate %	2018/19 Estimate %
Estimate in 1617 Strategy	35.84	1.67	(0.30)
Current forecast	27.85		

There has been a reduction against Estimate mainly due to slippage forecast slippage in the capital program.

Adoption of the CIPFA Treasury Management Code: The Authority adopted the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's *Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice (Revised in 2011)* in March 2005.

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Appendix 2

Money Market Data and PWLB Rates

The average, low and high rates correspond to the rates during the financial year rather than those in the tables below.

Please note that the PWLB rates below are Standard Rates. Authorities eligible for the Certainty Rate can borrow at a 0.20% reduction. Borrowing eligible for the project rate can be undertaken at a 0.40% reduction.

Table 1: Bank Rate, Money Market Rates

Date	Bank Rate	O/N LIBID	7-day LIBID	1-month LIBID	3-month LIBID	6-month LIBID	12-month LIBID	2-yr SWAP Bid	3-yr SWAP Bid	5-yr SWAP Bid
01/4/2016	0.50	0.36	0.36	0.39	0.46	0.61	0.88	0.78	0.83	0.98
30/4/2016	0.50	0.36	0.36	0.38	0.47	0.62	0.90	0.86	0.95	1.13
31/5/2016	0.50	0.35	0.37	0.39	0.46	0.61	0.89	0.82	0.92	1.09
30/6/2016	0.50	0.35	0.36	0.39	0.43	0.55	0.80	0.49	0.49	0.60
31/7/2016	0.50	0.15	0.45	0.42	0.52	0.64	0.77	0.47	0.47	0.54
31/8/2016	0.25	0.11	0.18	0.18	0.38	0.54	0.69	0.42	0.42	0.48
30/9/2016	0.25	0.10	0.25	0.45	0.51	0.61	0.74	0.43	0.42	0.47
Minimum	0.25	0.02	0.15	0.18	0.30	0.50	0.66	0.38	0.37	0.42
Average	0.43	0.26	0.37	0.42	0.52	0.66	0.83	0.61	0.64	0.75
Maximum	0.50	0.43	0.55	0.61	0.72	0.83	1.04	0.88	0.99	1.20
Spread	0.25	0.41	0.40	0.43	0.42	0.33	0.38	0.51	0.62	0.78

Table 2: PWLB Borrowing Rates - Fixed Rate, Maturity Loans (Standard Rate)

Change Date	Notice No	1 year	4½-5 yrs	9½-10 yrs	19½-20 yrs	29½-30 yrs	39½-40 yrs	49½-50 yrs
01/4/2016	125/16	1.33	1.82	2.51	3.24	3.33	3.19	3.15
30/4/2016	165/16	1.37	1.95	2.65	3.34	3.40	3.25	3.21
31/5/2016	205/16	1.36	1.93	2.56	3.22	3.27	3.11	3.07
30/6/2016	249/16	1.17	1.48	2.09	2.79	2.82	2.61	2.57
31/7/2016	292/16	1.07	1.31	1.84	2.57	2.65	2.48	2.44
31/8/2016	336/16	1.09	1.23	1.65	2.22	2.29	2.12	2.08
30/9/2016	380/16	1.02	1.20	1.70	2.34	2.43	2.29	2.27
	Low	1.01	1.15	1.62	2.20	2.27	2.10	2.07
	Average	1.20	1.54	2.12	2.81	2.87	2.70	2.67
	High	1.40	2.00	2.71	3.40	3.46	3.31	3.28

Table 3: PWLB Borrowing Rates - Fixed Rate, Equal Instalment of Principal (EIP) Loans (Standard Rate)

Change Date	Notice No	4½-5 yrs	9½-10 yrs	19½-20 yrs	29½-30 yrs	39½-40 yrs	49½-50 yrs
01/4/2016	125/16	1.50	1.86	2.54	2.99	3.25	3.34
30/4/2016	165/16	1.59	1.99	2.68	3.11	3.34	3.42

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31/5/2016	205/16	1.58	1.97	2.58	2.99	3.23	3.30
30/6/2016	249/16	1.24	1.51	2.11	2.55	2.79	2.86
31/7/2016	292/16	1.13	1.34	1.87	2.31	2.58	2.67
31/8/2016	336/16	1.12	1.25	1.67	2.02	2.23	2.31
30/9/2016	380/16	1.05	1.22	1.72	2.13	2.36	2.44
	Low	1.03	1.17	1.64	2.00	2.20	2.28
	Average	1.30	1.57	2.15	2.58	2.82	2.89
	High	1.63	2.04	2.73	3.17	3.41	3.48

Table 4: PWLB Variable Rates (standard rate)

	1-M Rate	3-M Rate	6-M Rate	1-M Rate	3-M Rate	6-M Rate
	Pre-CSR	Pre-CSR	Pre-CSR	Post-CSR	Post-CSR	Post-CSR
1/4/2016	0.61	0.65	0.67	1.51	1.55	1.57
30/4/2016	0.61	0.65	0.67	1.51	1.55	1.57
31/5/2016	0.65	0.66	0.70	1.55	1.56	1.60
30/6/2016	0.64	0.62	0.62	1.54	1.52	1.52
31/7/2016	0.55	0.48	0.45	1.45	1.38	1.35
31/8/2016	0.38	0.41	0.48	2.18	1.31	1.38
30/9/2016	0.38	0.40	0.48	1.28	1.30	1.38

Please note PWLB rates are standard rates